On the equivalence of G-weak and -strong cores in the marriage problem by Koji Takamiya
On the equivalence of G-weak and -strong cores in the
marriage problem 
Koji Takamiya
Institute of Social and Economic Research
Abstract
In the marriage problem (two-sided one-to-one matching problem), it is well-known that the
weak core, the strong core and the set of stable matchings are all equivalent. This paper
generalizes the above observation considering the G-weak core and the G-strong core. These
are core concepts in which blocking power is restricted to the coalitions belonging to the
prescribed class of coalitions G. I give a necessary and sufficient condition that G should
satisfy for the equivalence of the G-weak core and the G-strong core.
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In the marriage problem (Gale and Shapley, 1964), it is well-known that the
weak core, the strong core and the set of stable matchings are all equiva-
lent (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). This paper generalizes this observation
considering the “G-weak core” and the “G-strong core.” These are core con-
cepts in which blocking power is restricted to the coalitions belonging to the
prescribed class of coalitions G. I give a theorem from which one obtains a
necessary and suﬃcient condition that G should satisfy for the equivalence of
the G-weak core and the G-strong core.
0.1 Preliminary deﬁnitions
A marriage problem is a list (M,W,(Ri)i∈M∪W). Here M is the set of
“men,” and W is the set of “women.” Assume that M and W are both
nonempty and ﬁnite. (Ri)i∈M∪W is a preference proﬁle. For i ∈ M (W,
resp.), Ri is assumed to be a linear ordering (i.e. complete, transitive and
anti-symmetric binary relation) over W∪{i} (M∪{i}, resp.). As usual, P i (Ii,
resp.) denotes the asymmetric (symmetric, resp.) part of Ri. Let P denote
the set of preference proﬁles. A matching is a function µ : M∪W → M∪W
satisfying
i ∈ M ⇒ µ(i) ∈ W ∪ {i},
i ∈ W ⇒ µ(i) ∈ M ∪ {i},
i ∈ M ∪ W ⇒ µ(µ(i)) = i.
Let M denote the set of matchings.
Let µ,ν ∈ M. Let S ⊂ M ∪W with S 6= ∅. Then we say that µ weakly
dominates ν via S if
∀i ∈ S, µR
iν;
∃j ∈ S : µP
jν;
µ(S) = S.
And we say that µ strongly dominates ν via S if
∀i ∈ S, µP
iν;
µ(S) = S.
When a matching µ dominates (weakly or strongly) some other match-
ing ν via S, equivalently, we say “S blocks ν by µ (with weak or strong
domination).”
Let G be a nonempty class of coalitions. Then the G-weak core is the set
of all matchings that are not strongly dominated by any other matchings via
1any coalitions in G. Similarly, the G-strong core is the set of all matchings
that are not weakly dominated by any other matchings via any coalitions in
G. For the case where G = 2M∪W\{∅}, these cores are simply called the weak
core and the strong core, respectively. Since in the sequel the components
M,W are ﬁxed, these G-cores are regarded as functions of preference proﬁles.
Let us denote the G-weak core by wCG, and the G-strong core by sCG. And
let wC and sC denote the weak core and the strong core, respectively.
Let V denote the set of “pairs.” Here a “pair” means a coalition con-
sisting of one man and one woman. That is, V := {S ⊂ M ∪ W | #S =
2, #(S∩M) = 1}. A stable matching is a matching that cannot be blocked
(with strong domination) by any pair or individual. Thus the set of stable
matchings is nothing but the G-weak core with G = {{i} | i ∈ M ∪ W} ∪ V .
0.2 Motivation
There are two observations that have motivated the present study. The ﬁrst
one is the following well-known result.
Theorem 0 (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990) Let G be {{i} | i ∈ M ∪ W} ∪ V .





Given the theorem in the above, one may suspect that the equivalence
similar to as stated in this theorem holds true for arbitrary G. However,
this is not the case. (A counter-example is Example 1 in the below.) Then
we are motivated to ask for what G one obtains such equivalence.
Example 1 Let M be {1,3} and W be {2,4}. Let G consist of only one










Consider a matching µ such that µ(1) = 1, µ(2) = 2 and µ(3) = 4, and
another matching ν such that ν(1) = 2 and ν(3) = 4. Then ν weakly
dominates µ via M ∪W. But no matchings strongly dominate µ via M ∪W.
Thus wCG(R) 6= sCG(R). 2
2The second observation that has motivated this study is some results
from implementation theory. In S¨ onmez (1997), it has been proved that in
the context of the marriage problem, the direct mechanism induced by any
solution that is individually rational and Pareto eﬃcient implements the G-
weak core in G-proof Nash equilibrium.1 This result uniﬁes several preceding
results in implementation by direct mechanisms in the marriage problem such
as Alcalde (1996), Ma (1995) and Shin and Suh (1996).
On the other hand, Takamiya (2005) proved that the direct mechanism
induced by any solution that is individually rational and Pareto eﬃcient
implements the G-strong core in strict G-proof Nash equilibrium, under
the additional assumption that G is monotonic.2 This result is proved in
the context of a general class of allocation problems (as deﬁned in S¨ onmez
(1999)) that contains the marriage problem as a special case.
Given these results, one would naturally ask when these two results over-
lap with each other. Then, one is motivated to ask for what G, the G-weak
core and the G-strong core are equivalent to each other.
1 Results
1.1 Main theorem and corollaries
Let G1 and G2 be classes of coalitions. In the sequel, for example, “wCG2 ⊂
sCG1” is a shorthand notation for “∀R ∈ P,wCG2(R) ⊂ sCG1(R).”
Condition A For any S ∈ G1, both of the following hold true:
(i) ({m,w} ⊂ S & {m,w} ∈ V ) ⇒ {m,w} ∈ G2, and
(ii) [i ∈ S & ((i ∈ M & W 6⊂ S) ∨ (i ∈ W & M 6⊂ S))] ⇒ {i} ∈ G2.
Then the following is the main theorem of this paper.
Theorem 1 G1 and G2 satisfy Condition A if, and only if, it holds true that
wCG2 ⊂ sCG1.
Let G be a class of coalitions. Then by replacing G1 and G2 with G in
Condition A above, one obtains a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the
1In a game in strategic-form, a strategy proﬁle is said to be “G-proof Nash equilibrium”
if no coalition belonging to G can deviate from that strategy proﬁle with every player in
the coalition being strictly better oﬀ. “Strict G-proof Nash equilibrium” is deﬁned in the
same way except that a group deviation succeeds merely with at least one player being
strictly better oﬀ and the other players not being worse oﬀ. These concepts originate in
Kalai, Postlewaite and Roberts (1979).
2Here G is said to be “monotonic” if for any coalition S in G, any supercoalition of S
belongs to G.
3equivalence of the G-weak core and the G-strong core. This is the most im-
portant corollary to Theorem 1.
Condition A0 For any S ∈ G, both of the following hold true:
(i) ({m,w} ⊂ S & {m,w} ∈ V ) ⇒ {m,w} ∈ G, and
(ii) [i ∈ S & ((i ∈ M & W 6⊂ S) ∨ (i ∈ W & M 6⊂ S))] ⇒ {i} ∈ G.
Corollary 1 G satisﬁes Condition A0 if, and only if, it holds true that wCG =
sCG.
The following presents some other corollaries that directly follow from
Theorem 1 in the above. Let us denote F = {{i} | i ∈ M ∪ W} ∪ V .
Corollary 2 For any class of coalitions G, wCF ⊂ sCG and sCF ⊂ wCG.
Corollary 3 If F ⊂ G, then sCF = wCF = sCG = wCG = wC = sC.
Clearly, the well-known Theorem 0 (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990) men-
tioned in Section 0.2 follows from Corollary 3. The following is somewhat
less obvious.
Corollary 4 F is the unique ⊂-minimal element in the set of classes of
coalitions {G | sCG = wCG = sC = wC}.
Remark In all these results, the assumption of linear preferences is essential.
Things would be totally diﬀerent when weak preferences are included. This
deserves independent research.
1.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of the “only if” part. Suppose that Condition A is satisﬁed and that
there exist some R ∈ P and µ ∈ M such that µ ∈ wCG2(R) and µ 6∈ sCG1(R).
Then there exists some S ∈ G1 that blocks µ with weak domination, that is,
for some ν ∈ M,
∀i ∈ S, ν(i)R
iµ(i), (1)
∃j ∈ S : ν(j)P
jµ(j), (2)
ν(S) = S. (3)
Then ﬁx j ∈ S that satisﬁes (2) above. And denote k = ν(j). Then there
are two cases that have to be considered:
(i) If k 6= j, then k ∈ S by (3). Then (i) of Condition A implies {j,k} ∈ G2.
And ν(k)P kµ(k) since all preferences are linear orderings. Thus ν strongly
dominates µ via {j,k}. This yields µ 6∈ wCG2(R), a contradiction.
4(ii) If k = j, then j having improved strictly from µ to ν means that j
was matched with some other individual in µ. Let us call this individual l.
Then, without loss of generality, assume j ∈ M. This implies l ∈ W. Let us
consider the two cases in the following:
(ii-1) First, assume W 6⊂ S. In this case, (ii) of Condition A implies
{j} ∈ G2. And clearly, ν strongly dominates µ via {j}. Then it follows
µ 6∈ wCG2(R), a contradiction.
(ii-2) Next, assume W ⊂ S. This implies l ∈ S. Then since linear prefer-
ences are assumed, it must be ν(l)P lµ(l). Let us denote h = ν(l). Then let
us consider two cases, namely h = l and h 6= l: First, assume h = l. Then
ν({j,l}) = {j,l}. Then it follows that ν strongly dominates µ via {j,l}.
And by (i) of Condition A, {j,l} ∈ G2. Thus µ 6∈ wCG2(R), a contradiction.
Second, assume h 6= l. This case is identical to the case (i) in the above. 2
Proof of the “if” part. Suppose that Condition A is not satisﬁed. Then I
want to show that there are some preference proﬁles R for which wCG2(R) 6⊂
sCG1(R). There are two cases to consider.
(i) Suppose that (i) of Condition A is not satisﬁed. Then there exist a
pair {m,w} and a coalition S such that
S ∈ G1, (4)
{m,w} ⊂ S, (5)
{m,w} 6∈ G2. (6)
Consider a preference proﬁle R ∈ P that satisﬁes
R
m : (w,m,···), (7)
R
w : (m,w,···), (8)
(i ∈ M ∪ W & i 6= m,w) ⇒ R
i : (i,···). (9)
Consider two matchings µ and ν such that
i ∈ M ∪ W ⇒ µ(i) = i; (10)
ν(m) = w, (11)
(i ∈ M ∪ W & i 6= m,w) ⇒ ν(i) = i. (12)
Clearly, ν strongly dominates µ via {m,w}. Note that no other matching
strongly dominates µ via any coalition. Then since {m,w} 6∈ G2 (by (6)), it
follows µ ∈ wCG2(R).
On the other hand, since ν(S) = S (by (5), (11) and (12)), ν weakly
dominates µ via S. And S ∈ G1 (by (4)). These imply µ 6∈ sCG1(R). Thus
wCG2(R) 6⊂ sCG1(R).
5(ii) Suppose that (ii) of Condition A is not satisﬁed. Then without loss
of generality, we may assume that there exist m ∈ M and a coalition S such
that
m ∈ S ∈ G1, (13)
W 6⊂ S, (14)
{m} 6∈ G2. (15)
Now ﬁx one w ∈ W such that w 6∈ S. (This is possible due to (14).)
Consider a preference proﬁle R ∈ P that satisﬁes
R
m : (m,w,···), (16)
R
w : (m,w,···), (17)
(i ∈ M ∪ W & i 6= m,w) ⇒ R
i : (i,···). (18)
Consider two matchings µ and ν such that
µ(m) = w, (19)
(i ∈ M ∪ W & i 6= m,w) ⇒ µ(i) = i; (20)
i ∈ M ∪ W ⇒ ν(i) = i. (21)
Clearly, ν strongly dominates µ via {m}. Note that no other matching
strongly dominates µ via any coalition. Then since {m} 6∈ G2 (by (15)), it
follows µ ∈ wCG2(R).
On the other hand, since ν(S) = S (by (21)), ν weakly dominates µ via S.
And S ∈ G1 (by (13)). These imply µ 6∈ sCG1(R). Thus wCG2(R) 6⊂ sCG1(R).
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